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Abstract: Machine learning (ML) models have been
shown to be vulnerable to Membership Inference At-
tacks (MIA), which infer the membership of a given
data point in the target dataset by observing the pre-
diction output of the ML model. While the key factors
for the success of MIA have not yet been fully under-
stood, existing defense mechanisms such as using L2
regularization [30] and dropout layers [27] take only the
model’s overfitting property into consideration. In this
paper, we provide an empirical analysis of the impact of
both the data and ML model properties on the vulnera-
bility of ML techniques to MIA. Our results reveal the re-
lationship between MIA accuracy and properties of the
dataset and training model in use. In particular, we show
that the size of shadow dataset, the class and feature bal-
ance and the entropy of the target dataset, the configu-
rations and fairness of the training model are the most
influential factors. Based on those experimental findings,
we conclude that along with model overfitting, multiple
properties jointly contribute to MIA success instead of
any single property. Building on our experimental find-
ings, we propose using those data and model properties
as regularizers to protect ML models against MIA. Our
results show that the proposed defense mechanisms can
reduce the MIA accuracy by up to 25% without sacrific-
ing the ML model prediction utility.
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1 Introduction
Machine Learning as a Service (MLaaS) are fully man-
aged services providing data scientists and developers,
and more generally data-driven organisations, with the
ability to build, train and deploy machine learning mod-
els. Third-party platforms are increasingly deploying
publicly accessible query interfaces (Amazon, Google,
and Microsoft) allowing users to train models on (po-
tentially sensitive) data while charging access to the
models on a pay-per-query basis. Although promising,
these "open and publicly available query-based" plat-
forms face several security and privacy challenges, in
particular when considering adversarial attacks probing
the outcome of the model to gain knowledge of the model
structure or to infer additional information about some
users’ records.
Amongst those threats, Membership Inference At-
tacks (MIA) as presented in a seminal work by Shokri
et al. [30], where an adversary seeks to infer whether a
given data record belongs to a model’s training dataset
given a (black-box) access to the ML model, is one of
the most prominent privacy challenges.
While some prior researches indicate the data-
dependency of the MIA [32, 33] and have attributed the
success of membership inference attacks to some ML
model properties [22, 30, 37] including the observation
that machine learning algorithms tend to return higher
confidence scores for examples that they have seen (i.e.,
records in the training dataset) versus those that they
encounter for the first time (e.g. overfitting, choice of
hyperparameters), understanding the main reasons be-
hind successful MIAs and why some ML models might
be more immune than others is key to designing suitable
defense mechanisms.
In this paper, we provide an empirical analysis to
capture the relation between MIA success, as studied by
[30] and a wide range of data and ML model properties.
We leverage our analysis to investigate how the relevant
properties can be used to improve the ML model’s resis-
tance to MIA without sacrificing its prediction accuracy.
The paper makes the following contributions:
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– We experimentally verify the impacts of different
data properties with MIA success on three well-
known real-world datasets. Specifically, we observe
that the size of the shadow dataset used by the at-
tacker and the feature balance of the target training
dataset have positive impact on MIA accuracy, i.e.
MIA accuracy increases with an increasing value of
a property, while the class balance and the entropy
of the target training dataset entropy have negative
impacts. Additionally, the number of features used
for training the target model does not show explicit
impact on MIA accuracy.
– We further explore the relation between ML model
properties and MIA accuracy. Our analysis shows
that increasing the depth of ML models and size
(number of nodes of each layer) achieves more accu-
rate membership inference attacks. It also reveals
that trained models with fairer predictive behav-
iors across records and subgroups exhibit higher re-
silience against MIA. Furthermore, our study shows
that MIA accuracy is heavily dependent on the com-
bination of target and shadow models, and more ef-
fective MIAs can be achieved by combining the use
of different types of shadow models.
– Building on our experimental findings, we propose
the use of influential model properties on MIA as
regularizers for the model training. In particular,
we investigate regularizers based on model’s fair-
ness and on the mutual information between dataset
records and model parameters. Our evaluation re-
sults show that training ML models with the pro-
posed regularizers can reduce MIA accuracy by up
to 25%. Interestingly, this is achieved while increas-
ing the model performance compared to both mod-
els using no regularization and models using L1 or
L2 regularizers.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Sec-
tion 2 introduces related work. In Section 3, we describe
our methodology and the experimental setup. We dis-
cuss the results from the experimental study in Section 4.
We propose a new defense method to improve ML mod-
els’ resilience against MIA in Section 5. We conclude
and provide remarks on future work in Section 6.
2 Overview & Related Work
We briefly overview the black-box Membership Inference
Attacks (MIA) and discuss the related work in analyzing
MIA and proposed defense approaches.
2.1 Membership Inference Attack (MIA)
Typically, a black-box MIA [30, 33] aims to learn
whether a record is part of the private training data
which is accessible by permitted parties without the de-
tails about the training data and training model. In this
paper, we instantiate MIA by the shadow model ap-
proach taken by Shokri et al. [30]. Their approach relies
on three key assumptions about the attacker’s capabili-
ties. Firstly, the attacker can acquire the model’s predic-
tion vector on any data record. Secondly, the attacker
knows the distribution of the target training dataset.
Thirdly, the attacker has the information about the tar-
get model’s structure.
The MIA shadow-model approach, represented in
Figure 1, is based on training two types of models:
shadow model and attack model. The purpose of a
shadow model is to imitate the target model’s behaviour
and produce outputs similar to it. The attack model is
a binary classifier that categorizes records into member
and non-member classes. The attack model is trained on
the prediction vectors and the class labels obtained from
the shadow model and tested against the class labels of
the target model (truth data/ground truth).
Further more, Salem et al. [27] proposed three re-
laxations of the shadow model to reduce the cost of per-
forming MIA. Such relaxations gradually removes the
number of shadow models and the dependency on the
background knowledge about the model structure and
the distribution of training dataset until none of them
is using. It finally ends up with a novel MIA inferring the
membership by measuring the statistical information of
the target model’s posterior without the shadow model.
MIA has been shown to be successful on various ML
models such as Artificial Neural Networks (ANN) [27,
30], Generative Adversarial Networks (GAN) [5, 11, 12]
and differentially private models [24] in a range of do-
mains such as social media [19], health [1], sequence-to-
sequence video captioning [13] and user mobility [23].
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TRAIN
MIA
:
Target Data
≈ (approx)
Shadow Data (Train/IN)
Shadow Data (Test/OUT)
⇒
⇒
Target Model
≈
Shadow Model
↑
Observations
(Data, Label, IN/OUT)
⇒
⇒
Predictions
≈
Predictions
(Data)
+ IN/OUT
(Label)
⇒ MIA
Attack Model
−−−−−−−−−−−→
ATTACK:
Adversary queries
↓
Attack output:
member or not
Fig. 1. Training and Attacking of MIA (using the shadow model approach [30]) attack model. Dataset IN/OUT is used for training/testing
the shadow model, then the IN/OUT are served as labels in attack model training.
2.2 MIA Analysis and Defense Approaches
[t] Understanding the reasons behind MIA. Sev-
eral studies consider the target model’s overfitting to be
a primary reason behind MIA’s success [11, 14, 30, 37].
For better understanding of MIA, Truex et al. [32, 33]
empirically studied the increased vulnerability of the
target model against MIA introduced by the minority
records in a skewed dataset as the performance of the
model is not uniform across all classes, hence the at-
tacker. The analysis in [32] also reveals that attack mod-
els can be transferable from one target model type to
another, which allows attacker to launch effective MIAs
even when the exact target model configuration is not
known.
The study in [33] finds a correlation between the
target model’s vulnerability to MIA and dataset charac-
teristics such as the feature distribution and the number
of classes. An increased risk of membership inference at-
tacks attributed to a higher number of classes in case of
multi-class datasets is also reported in [30].
To further investigate the resilience of ML models
to membership inference attacks, the authors of [36] in-
troduce the concept of MIA-indistinguishability. Perfect
MIA-indistinguishability indicates that, for a given pre-
diction output of the ML model, there are equal prob-
abilities that the input record is and is not part of the
training dataset. A model whose prediction behavior is
close to perfect MIA-indistinguishability has therefore
strong defenses against MIAs.
Defense against MIA. A successful MIA exploits
a model’s tendency to yield higher confidence value
when encountering data that they are trained on (mem-
bers) than the others.
The property of a model to overfitting towards its
training data makes it vulnerable to MIA [37]. Thus,
existing defenses against MIA attempt to reduce over-
fitting of a model by applying regularizers like L2-
regularizer [30] that generalize a model’s prediction or
by adding Dropout layers to the model [31] that ignore
a few neurons in each iteration of training to avoid high
training accuracy. Nasr et al. [22] proposed a min-max
game-theoretic defense method using the highest pos-
sible MIA accuracy as adversarial regularization to de-
crease the target model’s prison loss while increasing
privacy against MIA.
Recent research [20] revealed that overfitting is a
necessary but not a sufficient condition for a successful
MIA, by showing that highly successful MIAs can be ob-
tained even for well-generalized models. This poses the
need for new defense strategies against MIA, different
from the existing overfitting-reduction approaches. One
of the alternative defense strategies is to use differential
privacy [3, 11, 21, 23]. Differential privacy can protect
the training dataset privacy using data perturbations
at the cost of model accuracy reductions. However, the
choice of the level of privacy (privacy budget ) is still
an open issue, since the model accuracy may be heavily
affected even for modest privacy budgets [32]. Further-
more, authors of [23] showed that defense mechanisms
based on differential privacy are not always effective, es-
pecially when an attacker is able to mimic the behavior
of the perturbation.
3 Methodology
The goal of this study is to analyze the effect of a wide
range of properties of dataset and ML model on MIA ac-
curacy. In this section, we introduce the explored prop-
erties and describe our experimental setup.
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3.1 Explored Properties and Their
Measures
As the target model for MIA, we consider a generic
ML classifier trained with dataset D(X, y), where each
record xi ∈ X is a vector of features and has a label
yi ∈ y. Each record xi ∈ X contains a set of feature
values xi.aj for each feature aj ∈ A. We denote the set
of the distinct feature values for a single feature aj as
Cj = {∪xi∈X xi.aj}6=.
Data Properties. Recent research has shown that
the performance of MIA is generally data dependent,
with significantly different attack success rates measured
on different datasets [32, 33]. In this study, we dissect
the impact of the dataset on MIA focusing on key data
properties such as the data size, balance in the classes
and features, number of selected features, and entropy
of the dataset. These are detailed below.
The balance in classes. To investigate the im-
pact of the class balance on MIA performance, we as-
sume the target model to be a binary classifier, such
that the balance between classes y ∈ {0, 1} is given by
P [y = 0]/P [y = 1] and measured as the frequency ratio
between the two classes over the dataset. For simplicity,
in the next sections we denote the class balance as the
percentage of one of the class labels.
The balance in features. For a single feature aj ∈ A,
feature balance is the probability ratio of one versus
all the other feature values in Cj . Similarly, for the
given dataset D(X, y), the set of the distinct feature
vectors for the feature set A is C = {∪xi∈Xxi}6=, then
the feature balance can be measured as the ratio be-
tween one unique value of feature vector against others
P [xi = c|c ∈ C]/P [xi 6= c|c ∈ C].
The entropy of the training dataset. Entropy of the
overall dataset HD can be measured by taking the mean
entropy over n number of features:
HD =
1
n
∑
j
H[aj ], (1)
where aj ∈ A are the features of the dataset D. The
entropy of each feature H[aj ] could be computed using
Shannon’s entropy formula [9] as below:
H[aj ] = −
∑
c∈Cj
Pc logPc, (2)
where Pc is the probability of each feature value c ∈ Cj .
Model Properties. Our study analyzes a variety
of properties concerning the ML model and its predic-
tion behavior. Recent studies [22, 30, 32] have identified
overfitting to be the primary contributor to membership
inference accuracy. Our analysis takes a step further by
examining the relation between MIA and several ML-
model design attributes, and by exploring the depen-
dence of MIA on model characteristics other than over-
fitting. The model properties considered in this study
are described below.
Model Architecture and Training Configuration. Us-
ing an Artificial Neural Network (ANN) as our default
classifier type, we explore two main architectural prop-
erties: the model depth (the number of hidden layers)
and the size of each layer (number of neurons). We also
include in our analysis a few key training parameters,
such as the learning rate and the learning regularizer.
Target-Shadow Model Combination. Following an
approach similar to [33], we consider various widely-
used classifier types to understand the effect of differ-
ent target-shadow model combinations on MIA: Logis-
tic Regression (LR), Support Vector Machine (SVM),
Random Forest (RF), k-Nearest Neighbour (kNN) and
ANN.
Mutual Information between model parameters and
training records. This property quantifies the informa-
tion extracted by the target model from the set of train-
ing records. Assume a generic ML model f(X; θ), whose
training is conducted over records xi ∈ X and generates
the model’s parameters θ. For such a model, the mutual
information IX is obtained as:
IX =
1
|X|
∑
xi∈X
I(xi; θ), (3)
where I(xi; θ) is the mutual information between an in-
dividual training record and θ, computed as below:
I(xi; θ) = H(xi)−H(xi|θ), (4)
where H(xi) is the entropy of one record and H(xi|θ) is
the conditional entropy that captures the uncertainty in
xi when the parameter values θ are known.
Deviations from perfect MIA-indistinguishability.
The perfect MIA-indistinguishability property defined
in [36] is a guarantee of perfect model resistance against
MIA. It indicates that, for a generic prediction output
y′, the input record has the same probability to be a
member or a non-member of the training dataset:
P [m = 1|yˆ = y′] = P [m = 0|yˆ = y′], (5)
where m ∈ {0, 1} is the membership value denoting
whether the record is a member (m = 1) or non-
member (m = 0) of the training set. Our analysis
explores how increasing deviations from perfect MIA-
indistinguishability affect the ML model resilience to
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MIA. We measure such deviations as the l∞-relative
metric between the considered probabilities and maxi-
mum divergence across the classes of y [36]:
δmi(f) := sup
y′∈y
| log{P [yˆ = y
′|m = 1]
P [yˆ = y′|m = 0]}| (6)
A model is presumably less vulnerable to MIA if δmi is
close to zero.
Model Fairness. We consider the model’s prediction
fairness towards different individuals or subgroups of the
datasets based on a set of particular protected features.
For examples, assume ‘Gender’ is a protected feature
in a dataset containing two feature values: ‘male’ and
‘female’. The fairness with respect to this protected fea-
tures indicates how equally the model treats ‘male’ and
‘female’ records in terms of prediction output. Among
the existing definitions of ML fairness [2, 4, 10, 35], we
consider the (i) group (or statistical) fairness, (ii) pre-
dictive fairness and (iii) individual fairness.
– Group fairness. A classifier f(X) =⇒ y is fair
towards two groups of records gi, gj ⊂ X if it
predicts a particular outcome for the individuals
across the protected subgroups with equal probabil-
ities [10, 35]:
P [yˆi = y′|xi ∈ gi, y′ ∈ y] = P [yˆj = y′|xj ∈ gj , y′ ∈ y],
(7)
where yˆi and yˆj are the predicted outcomes for the
records in groups gi and gj respectively and y′ ∈ y is
the preferred class label that needs to be predicted
fairly for all groups of records. This definition is also
known as demographic parity. To quantify the group
fairness, we estimate the probabilistic difference of
prediction δg between two subgroups of the records
for n number of class labels as below:
δg(f) :=
1
n
∑
y′∈y
|P [yˆi = y′]− P [yˆj = y′]| (8)
– Predictive fairness. A classifier has a predictive fair-
ness if the subgroups of the records that truly belong
to the preferred class have equal probabilities to be
predicted in that class [35]. That is,
P [yˆi = y′|yi = y′, xi ∈ gi] = P [yˆj = y′|yj = y′, xj ∈ gj ],
(9)
where y′ is the preferred class label. This is also
known as Equal Opportunity in the literature. For
n class labels, the deviation from perfect predictive
fairness δp can be measured as:
δp(f) :=
1
n
∑
y′∈y
|P [yˆi = y′|yi = y′]−P [yˆj = y′|yj = y′]|
(10)
– Individual fairness. This concept, introduced in [8],
indicates that the predictor produces similar predic-
tion outputs for similar inputs. For a ML classifier,
the condition of individual fairness can be formal-
ized as follows [10]:
∆(yˆxi , yˆxj ) ≤ d(xi, xj) (11)
where, d(xi, xj) is the distance between two generic
input records xi and xj , and ∆(yˆxi , yˆxj ) is the dis-
tance between the corresponding prediction outputs.
For a given dataset D(X, y), the overall ∆ and d can
be measured in different ways. In [8], a statistical
distance metric is proposed for ∆ that measures the
Total Variation (TV) norm distance between two
probabilities for the outcome of the classifier for the
two considered records:
∆tv =
1
n
∑
yˆxi ,yˆxj∈y
|P [yˆxi ]− P [yˆxj ]| (12)
This metric assumes that the distance metric se-
lected for d will scale the measured distance within
[0, 1] range. Authors of [8] also suggest that a better
choice for ∆ is to use the relative l∞ norm metric
which would allow the use of a metric for d that con-
siders two records to be similar if d << 1 and dis-
similar if d >> 1. To keep both the d and ∆ within
the same range [0,1], we measure their statistical
distances in both the cases. Finally, we compute the
deviation from individual fairness δi as follows:
δi(f) :=
∑
xi,xj∈X
|∆tv − |P [xi]− P [xj ]|| (13)
3.2 Experimental Setup
Next we present the datasets in use and the ML models
for MIA.
Datasets. We consider three datasets widely used
for the analysis of MIA [15, 22, 28, 30, 32, 33]: Purchase,
Texas hospital, and UCI Adult datasets.
Primarily, our datasets are pre-processed as below:
1. Purchase dataset [16]. The Purchase dataset in-
cludes two subsets: the customer transactions and
Data and Model Dependencies of Membership Inference Attacks 6
the history of the incentives offered to them. To have
a complete dataset, we join the two subsets by the
customer IDs. After the join operation, we have a
dataset with 16 features. We prepare the primary
dataset by uniformly sampling 400, 000 records.
2. Texas hospital dataset [7]. We avoid the features
with missing values and pre-process this dataset by
selecting 16 features (same number of features as the
Purchase dataset). For the primary dataset, we also
randomly sample 400, 000 records from years 2006
to 2009.
3. UCI Adult dataset [25]. This is a small dataset con-
taining 48, 842 records with 14 features. We use it
as the primary dataset directly in our experiments.
For all the datasets, we restrict the set of output classes
to two (label 0 and 1). By focusing on binary datasets,
we simplify the analysis of data properties such as the
balance in classes. Further more, we do not consider im-
age datasets (e.g., CIFAR-10 [17]) due to the difficulties
these datasets would pose on the analysis of feature bal-
ance. In particular, the number of features would be
very high when considering the raw image pixels, while
the adoption of more elaborate features (e.g., edges,
shapes, motion) would make it difficult to explore dif-
ferent feature-balance ranges. Overall, we choose three
datasets that have been extensively used in previous
work, and which are suitable to exploring a wide range
of properties.
ML Models. By default, we implement the target,
shadow, and attack models using Artificial Neural Net-
works (ANN) with the hyperparameters setup reported
in Table 1. We fix the member rate to 75%, i.e., for
every experiment the 75% of dataset records are mem-
bers of the training set. Our default ML model achieves
85% train 84% test accuracy on Texas dataset, (76%,
75%) accuracy on Purchase, and (70%, 71%) accuracy
on Adult. To reduce the computational complexity and
thereby extend the scale of our experiments, we perform
the attack using by default only one shadow model: this
approach builds on the findings in [27], i.e., that similar
MIA accuracy is achieved using one instead of multiple
shadow models. All ML models are trained and tested
using Theano [18] and Lasagne [6] libraries.
4 Analysis and Results
This section experimentally explores the relation be-
tween MIA and the different properties described in
(a) Default model setup.
Model Hyperparameters
Artificial Neural Network (ANN) α = 0.001, solver= sgd,
epochs=50,λ=1e-7
1-hidden layer, 50 neurons
(b) Additional model setups.
Models Hyperparameters
Logistic Regression (LR) C=0.01, solver= LBGFS
Support Vector Machine (SVM) C=0.01, kernel= RBF
Random Forest (RF) n-estimators=100,
criterion=gini, max-depth=2
k-Nearest Neighbour (kNN) p=2, neighbors=3
Table 1. Selection of the hyperparameters for the ML models.
Section 3.1. To evaluate MIA’s performance, we mea-
sure the accuracy of the attack model (MIA accuracy),
which corresponds to the fraction of correct membership
predictions. To show the uncertainty on MIA accuracy
results, we provide the average MIA accuracy along with
the 95% confidence interval (error bars).
4.1 Effect of Data Properties on MIA
The Size of Dataset: In our experiments, we report
the average results of the MIA accuracy when varying
the size of the target dataset and the shadow dataset
respectively. Particularly, to tune the size of dataset
(either the target dataset or the shadow dataset), we
sample subsets from the primary datasets in the range
[10K,100K] for both Purchase and Texas datasets and
[1K,10K] for Adult dataset.
First, from Figure 2, we observe that with a fixed
target dataset size, the size of shadow datasets has a
positive impact on MIA accuracy. That is, by increasing
the size of Shadow dataset, the average MIA accuracy
increases from about 0.5 to 1 over all the three datasets.
In contrast, as illustrated in Figure 3, when fixing
the size of the shadow datasets, the size of target dataset
does not show any significant impact on MIA accuracy.
This suggest that the size of shadow datasets indicates
and bounds the advantage/power of MIA adversaries
against a given target dataset.
This result confirms how overfitting impacts the
MIA accuracy from a new perspective. It is known that a
relatively small target training dataset produces higher
overfitted models [37]. Our results therefore validate the
findings of some of the existing works which have shown
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(a) Purchase dataset. (b) Texas dataset. (c) Adult dataset.
Fig. 2. Effects of varying the size of the shadow datasets on MIA accuracy.
(a) Purchase dataset. (b) Texas dataset. (c) Adult dataset.
Fig. 3. Effects of varying the size of the target datasets on MIA accuracy.
that overfitting is a major reason to the success of MIA,
as the size of shadow models (and hence the overfitting)
has a positive effect on MIA performance.
The Balance in Classes: In our experiments,
we convert all datasets to binary-class datasets. This
way, we can measure the impact of class balance by tun-
ing just one class balance value. That is, a class bal-
ance value x% indicates a x/(100-x) or (100-x)/x split
between classes 0 and 1, with 50% representing a per-
fect balance. Specifically, we assign two classes (0,1) to
the records of the Purchase and Texas datasets by us-
ing Gaussian mixture clustering [26, 29] and the Adult
dataset already contains two classes based on the salary
feature.
Figure 4 depicts the effect of class balance on the
MIA performance over the three datasets. In the sub-
figures, each dot shows the MIA performance of one ex-
periment from a target training dataset with a given
class balance. The figure shows the results for 100 ex-
periments for each class balance, and as such represents
the distribution of MIA accuracy across different class
balance values.
From Figure 4, we discover that with an increas-
ing class balance, the minimum value of MIA accuracy
is decreasing from about 0.7 to 0.5 in all three datasets.
Such results reflect the truth that the class balance mea-
sures (and has a negative impacts on) the lower bound of
MIA accuracy. We also note that similar results are also
reported in [32], where authors observed that the skew-
ness of the training dataset plays a role in increasing
MIA performance, as it becomes difficult for the model
to generalize the prediction over a class of fewer number
of instances. This behaviour can be explained by the tar-
get model’s bias in prediction. The model produces less
biased prediction towards one particular class when it is
trained on a dataset that has properly balanced classes
giving less advantage to an adversary.
The Balance in Features: For each of the
datasets, we select the 5 features that have the highest
mutual information with the class labels and measure
the feature balances as the percentage probability ratio
of the selected combination of the feature values.
Figure 5 shows the performance of the attack on the
datasets for the class balances < 50% with the selected
5 features. Similarly to our experiments in Figure 4, we
run 100 experiments for each feature balance so that
we report the distribution of MIA performance over dif-
ferent values of feature balance. The results show an
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(a) Purchase dataset. (b) Texas dataset. (c) Adult dataset.
Fig. 4. Effects of the balance in the classes on MIA accuracy.
(a) Purchase dataset. (b) Texas dataset. (c) Adult dataset.
Fig. 5. Effects of the balance in the features on MIA accuracy.
increase in the lower bound of MIA accuracy for an in-
creased imbalance of the features.
An increase of the features balance results in increas-
ing the number of data points that have similar feature
values. As a result, the target model’s prediction be-
comes more biased towards dominant feature values and
as such correct guesses from an MIA attacker, given a
target, become more likely.
The Number of Features: Figure 6 represents
the observed attack accuracy for the datasets by grad-
ually increasing the number of features. In our experi-
ments, we vary the number of features while the specific
features in each experiment are randomly selected.
The figure suggests the number of features of a train-
ing dataset does not have any effect on the MIA accu-
racy. This indicates that we could leverage the number
of features to achieve higher ML utility without sacrific-
ing the privacy disclosure against MIA.
The Entropy of The Training Dataset: Figure
7 shows the attack accuracy as a function of entropy of
the training dataset. In general, as the entropy of the
training dataset increases,the MIA accuracy decreases.
This is particularly true for the Purchase and Texas
datasets. The decrease is slower for the Adult dataset.
This negative impact of the entropy on the attack accu-
racy is due to higher amount of randomness increasing
the difficulty to infer membership information from the
dataset.
4.2 Effect of Model Properties on MIA
Model and Training Parameters.We assess whether
model and training parameters can impact the MIA ac-
curacy. For the model parameters, we vary the depth
of the ANN model from 1 to 5 hidden layers and the
number of nodes of each layer from 5 to 1000.
For the training parameters, we vary the learning
rate α (from 10−5 to 1) and the L2-ratio regularizer λ
(between 0 and 3). Then we ensure that all configura-
tions tested against MIA provide similar prediction per-
formance for the ML model, e.g., by pruning off those
with lower (< 0.9) training and test accuracy.
Figure 8 reports the MIA accuracy obtained for dif-
ferent numbers of layer nodes and different training pa-
rameters α and λ using 1 to 5 hidden layers. The results
show that deeper ANN architectures (e.g., 5 hidden lay-
ers) are consistently more vulnerable to MIA compared
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(a) Purchase dataset. (b) Texas dataset. (c) Adult dataset.
Fig. 6. Effects of the number of features on MIA accuracy.
(a) Purchase dataset. (b) Texas dataset. (c) Adult dataset.
Fig. 7. Effects of the entropy of the training dataset on MIA accuracy.
to shallower configurations (e.g., 1 layer only). We also
observe that the higher the number of nodes in the
model the higher the MIA accuracy.
Furthermore, Figure 8 shows that the choice of the
training parameters has a significant impact on MIA
accuracy. In particular, we observe that large learning
rates (e.g., 0.1) result in more accurate MIA attacks.
Concerning the effect of the L2-ratio regularizer, from
λ = 0 onwards we observe a decrease of MIA accuracy.
However, after a certain point (e.g., λ = 0.1 for a 1-
layer ANN on Adult dataset), increasing the amount of
regularization makes MIAs more effective than in the
case of no regularization (λ = 0).
Target-Shadow Model Combination. Table
2 reports the MIA accuracy for different target and
shadow model types. Specifically, we test different ML
classifiers, including k-Nearest Neighbors (kNN), Logis-
tic Regression (LR), Random Forest (RF) and Support
Vector Machine (SVM). We observe that different combi-
nations of target and shadow model architectures gener-
ally result in different MIA accuracy, and that the most
effective shadow-model choice also varies across different
datasets. Interestingly, using shadow models with an ar-
chitecture type that matches the target does not guaran-
tee maximum MIA accuracy. Overall, these results sup-
port the notion of MIA transferability introduced in [32],
where attackers do not always need to know the exact
target model configuration to launch an effective MIA
as attack models can be transferable from one target
model type to another.
In addition, we evaluate the MIA accuracy in a
one-versus-all scenario, where each target model archi-
tecture is consecutively tested against the five different
shadow model architectures. From Table 2, we observe
in this new scenario a significant increase (in the range
of +10%) of MIA accuracy compared to previous one-
to-one cases. We can conclude that the MIA accuracy is
highly classifier-dependent, and that the combined use
of different shadow model architectures results in much
more severe attacks.
Mutual Information between Records and
Model Parameters. The mutual information I(X; θ)
between the ML model parameters and the training
records, defined in Section 3.1, is a measure of the infor-
mation learnt by the model over the dataset, i.e., cap-
tured from the features of the training records. Higher
values of I(X; θ) may be as such indicative of increased
model’s vulnerability in the face of MIAs. To experiment
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(a) Purchase dataset.
(b) Texas dataset.
(c) Adult dataset.
Fig. 8. MIA accuracy for the i) different number of nodes, ii) different learning rates and iii) different L2-ratios over different datasets.
with different levels of mutual information, we use the
default ANN model and re-train it from scratch 1000
times (we perform 200 experiments for 10% to 50% class
balances) with random parameter initialization. At each
iteration, we collect all model parameters and derive
I(X; θ). Lastly, we group the different model instances
based on the I(X; θ) range.
The results shown in Figure 9 confirm that higher
values of I(X; θ) may indicate increasing attack’s expo-
sure to MIA. In particular, despite some differences in
the results between datasets, we observe that higher mu-
tual information is generally associated with more accu-
rate MIA.
We conjecture that the observed difference between
the Adult dataset and the other datasets in terms of
MIA accuracy ranges, comes from the lower data size
(10K instead of 100K). Even if the values of average
mutual information I(X; θ) are the same across datasets,
the smaller training set in the case of the Adult dataset
results in less total information “learnt” by the model
during training, which in turn reduces the MIA accuracy.
MIA-indistinguishability. The perfect MIA-
indistinguishability property introduced in [36] (Eq.5)
indicates perfect resistance of a ML model to MIAs.
Here we analyze the relation between the deviation
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(a) Purchase dataset. (b) Texas dataset. (c) Adult dataset.
Fig. 9. Relationship between the Mutual Information, IX and MIA accuracy.
(a) Purchase dataset.
Target models Shadow models
ANN kNN LR RF SVM All
ANN 60.09 52.38 58.11 55.41 52.38 69.25
kNN 55.04 55.92 55.57 53.21 51.68 70.45
LR 51.14 53.55 54.08 56.51 57.23 70.49
RF 56.26 55.16 54.07 57.69 50.93 71.84
SVM 51.09 58.56 55.69 51.61 52.99 70.11
(b) Texas dataset.
Target models Shadow models
ANN kNN LR RF SVM All
ANN 57.62 57.07 54.34 61.23 56.54 69.97
kNN 55.30 54.57 54.36 57.52 51.37 68.45
LR 52.08 54.69 55.82 54.09 55.29 67.54
RF 53.88 55.78 58.90 57.11 59.61 72.64
SVM 56.43 50.62 53.94 52.35 57.14 62.88
(c) Adult dataset.
Target models Shadow models
ANN kNN LR RF SVM All
ANN 59.76 56.76 53.30 52.27 55.56 70.28
kNN 50.95 56.42 51.97 50.57 54.62 70.98
LR 56.18 53.68 55.04 56.97 47.47 70.18
RF 55.43 60.09 46.88 59.27 52.69 72.76
SVM 61.45 53.83 51.82 55.02 52.74 73.06
Table 2. MIA accuracy for the different target and shadow model
combinations. The right-most column ("All") shows the MIA
accuracy for each of the target models against all the five examined
ML algorithms used as the shadow models.
of the ML model from perfect MIA-indistinguishability
δmi(f) and its vulnerability to MIA. As described in
Section 3.1, δmi(f) is measured as the difference be-
tween the training-set member and non-member predic-
tion probabilities. Intuitively, we expect lower values of
δmi(f) to result in limited MIA accuracy, and larger de-
viations to enable more powerful attacks. To experiment
with different ranges of δmi(f), we enforce different sam-
pling biases on the training data, especially by varying
the train/test split and the class balance.
Figure 10 shows that while small deviations (0
to 0.1) from perfect MIA-indistinguishability generally
guarantee low MIA accuracy (50 to 55% MIA accuracy),
increasing deviations not always result in more success-
ful attacks. This is particularly evident in the case of
Adult dataset, where the MIA accuracy falls in very
similar ranges for considerably different values of δmi(f)
such as 0.1 and 0.4.
Model’s Fairness. The fairness metrics defined in
Section 3.1 indicate the difference of the model’s pre-
diction output between individual dataset records or
groups of records, with smaller values of these metrics
representing fairer model behaviors. Here we analyze the
impact of group, predictive, and individual fairness on
the MIA-vulnerability by assessing the extent to which
unfair model behaviors result in higher MIA accuracy.
To experiment with different fairness levels, we build on
the empirical observation that more balanced datasets
determine fairer prediction behaviors. Hence, we vary
the class and feature balance of the data and for each
configuration me measure both the model fariness and
the MIA accuracy, thus obtaining the results in Fig-
ure 11. These results show reduced MIA accuracy when
fairness is high, i.e., δg, δp, δi are close to 0. However, not
all fairness properties have the same effect on MIA; for
example group fairness shows a stronger and more con-
sistent impact on MIA accuracy across different datasets
compared to individual fairness.
4.3 Discussion
Impact of different data and model properties on
MIA. Our experimental analyses found that a variety
of properties have an effect on MIA, which concern the
data, the target (and shadow) model architecture, as
well as the model prediction behavior. About the data,
we observed that the shadow data size (volume of the
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(a) Purchase dataset. (b) Texas dataset. (c) Adult dataset.
Fig. 10. Results showing the level of a model’s vulnerability towards MIA as the deviation from the perfect MIA-indinguishability against
MIA accuracy.
(a) Group fairness. (b) Predictive fairness. (c) Individual fairness.
Fig. 11. Impact of model’s fairness on MIA accuracy. Larger values of δg , δp, δi indicate reduced prediction fairness. Data size is 100,000,
number of features is 5, class and feature balances are below 50%.
attacker’s data), the class and feature balance in the
target-model training set , and the entropy of the train-
ing dataset are the most influential factors, producing
variations of MIA accuracy between of 0.5 and 0.75. Con-
cerning the ML model, we found that ML model designs
or settings that are equivalent in terms of prediction
performance (i.e., similar train/test accuracy), can have
considerably different exposures to MIAs. This depends
especially on the model architecture and hyperparam-
eters (e.g., deeper and larger neural networks appear
much more MIA-vulnerable) and on the model’s predic-
tion fairness across subgroups of dataset records, which
can increase or decrease the MIA accuracy respectively
by up to 0.2 for all datasets.
For other properties, such as the size and the num-
ber of features in the model training set, the relation
with MIA is weaker as no clear trend could be identi-
fied from the experiments. Furthermore, our results have
shown that not only different properties have a different
effect on MIA, but the impact of a specific property can
also be strongly dataset-dependent. This is evident for
properties such as the dataset entropy and the mutual
information IX , whose impact on MIA is substantially
different for the Adult dataset compared to the other
two. Cases like this require further exploration, in par-
ticular for unveiling the role of individual feature on the
MIA, e.g., looking at the distance between individual
records among their feature values [38].
Overfitting does not explain it all. Recent re-
search [22, 30, 32] pointed to overfitting as the main
contributor to MIA success. Interestingly, all the differ-
ent MIA accuracy values shown in our analyses are ob-
tained using non-overfitted target models. These results
are in accordance with [20], and confirm that overfitting
is by no means necessary for exposing membership in-
formation from training data. To further illustrate this,
Table 3 reports the MIA accuracy along with the train
and test accuracy of the target model measured for dif-
ferent hyperparameter and training settings (specifically,
the number of layers and the L2 regularizer). For each
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(a) 1-layer, no regularizer (λ=0).
Datasets Train Acc. Test Acc. MIA Acc.
Adult 80.956 81.232 58.893
Purchase 71.512 71.405 54.121
Texas 78.465 78.226 57.716
(b) 5-layers, no regularizer).
Datasets Train Acc. Test Acc. MIA Acc.
Adult 89.806 89.782 71.080
Purchase 88.802 88.780 71.736
Texas 90.993 90.862 71.257
(c) 1-layer, L2 regularizer (λ=0.01).
Datasets Train Acc. Test Acc. MIA Acc.
Adult 74.972 75.076 55.977
Purchase 64.829 65.532 56.36
Texas 75.974 76.074 49.891
(d) 5-layers, L2 regularizer (λ=0.01).
Datasets Train Acc. Test Acc. MIA Acc.
Adult 88.364 88.355 66.955
Purchase 88.33 88.358 70.211
Texas 90.498 90.473 72.664
Table 3. Train, test and MIA accuracy (%) obtained on the target models having 1 and 5 hidden layers with λ = 0.0 and λ = 0.01.
dataset, we observe significant differences in MIA accu-
racy across the four sub-tables, despite none of these
configurations presents any overfitting – all settings pro-
duce very similar train and test accuracy.
Hard to identify the main property respon-
sible for MIA’s success. Overall, the results in Sec-
tion 4.1 and Section 4.2 show that a range of different
properties contribute to MIA success. Finding which one
is the main property that is responsible for the MIA-
vulnerability of a ML model is a particularly challeng-
ing task, given also that data/model properties are of-
ten interdependent. For example, properties such as the
class and feature balance are correlated with each other,
and the same applies to the different measures of predic-
tion fairness. To better visualize these relations, Table 4
presents both the linear (Pearson’s) and rank (Spear-
man’s) correlation coefficients between pairs of data and
model properties from Sections 4.1 and 4.2. The preva-
lence of 0.3 to 0.7 (-0.3 to -0.7) values indicates that
most of the pairs have at least a moderate positive (or
negative) relationship. Furthermore, Table 4 shows that
model properties can also be correlated to data proper-
ties. For example, the dataset class balance is related
to the predictive fairness of a ML model, and the same
happens between group or individual fairness and the
feature balance.
No property can alone measure the exposure
of ML models to MIA. A further consequence of
the fact that multiple properties affect the MIA perfor-
mance is that none of them can alone precisely mea-
sure the model resilience against membership inference.
Overfitting, as shown above, does not provide an ulti-
mate indication of MIA-vulnerability as non-overfitted
models can be heavily exposed to the attack. Simi-
lar considerations apply to MIA-indistinguishability, for
which we found that larger deviations from perfect
MIA-indistinguishability (δmi(f) in Figure 10) not al-
ways reflect on more MIA-vulnerable ML models as
observed across different datasets. Nonetheless, due to
their demonstrated relation with MIA accuracy, several
properties can still be exploited when developing defense
methods for ML models against MIAs. We explore these
opportunities in the next section.
5 Towards MIA-resilient ML
models
Based on the experimental results in Section 4, we pro-
pose to use model properties that positively (or mod-
erately positively) impact MIA accuracy as regularizers
for the ML model training. It is intuitive that minimis-
ing such a regularizer can reduce MIA accuracy while
improving the underlying model’s performance. Algo-
rithm 1 depicts our main idea where for k number of
epochs, we calculate a given fairness or the mutual in-
formation between the records and model parameters l
number of timesin Line 3-7, then use it as the regular-
izer for model training in Line 9, where l(·) is the loss
function,
∑
j |θ × er| is the regularizing function with
weight λ.
To evaluate the effect of our proposed regularizer
on both the underlying model’s prediction performance
and the resilience to MIA, we setup our experiments
as follows. For all the experiments, the size of training
dataset is fixed to 10,000 with <50% balance in the class.
Fairness is measured on 5 features. Number of epochs k
is set to 50 and number of iterations l is set to 5. We
measure the performance of the selected regularizers in
terms of base ML model training and test accuracy, and
MIA accuracy.
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(a) Purchase dataset.
Prop. 1 Prop. 2 Pearson’s r Spearman’s r
Class Balance Feature Balance -0.329 -0.709
Class Balance Entropy 0.473 0.291
Feature Balance Entropy 0.541 0.367
Group Fair. Predictive Fair. 0.24 0.2
Group Fair. Individual Fair. 0.537 0.461
Predictive Fair. Individual Fair. 0.39 0.38
Group Fair. Class Balance -0.185 -0.227
Predictive Fair. Class Balance -0.777 -0.793
Individual Fair. Class Balance -0.001 0.001
Group Fair. Feature Balance -0.588 -0.465
Predictive Fair. Feature Balance -0.398 -0.391
Individual Fair. Feature Balance -0.972 -0.979
(b) Texas dataset.
Prop. 1 Prop. 2 Pearson’s r Spearman’s r
Class Balance Feature Balance -0.831 -0.955
Class Balance Entropy 0.972 0.994
Feature Balance Entropy -0.801 -0.944
Group Fair. Predictive Fair. 0.425 0.421
Group Fair. Individual Fair. 0.552 0.322
Predictive Fair. Individual Fair. 0.194 0.088
Group Fair. Class Balance -0.17 -0.179
Predictive Fair. Class Balance -0.703 -0.719
Individual Fair. Class Balance 0.002 0.002
Group Fair. Feature Balance -0.818 -0.787
Predictive Fair. Feature Balance -0.541 -0.533
Individual Fair. Feature Balance -0.441 -0.292
(c) Adult dataset.
Prop. 1 Prop. 2 Pearson’s r Spearman’s r
Class Balance Feature Balance -0.962 -0.965
Class Balance Entropy 0.833 0.817
Feature Balance Entropy -0.825 -0.815
Group Fair. Predictive Fair. 0.104 0.056
Group Fair. Individual Fair. 0.378 0.165
Predictive Fair. Individual Fair. 0.164 0.11
Group Fair. Class Balance -0.178 -0.215
Predictive Fair. Class Balance -0.682 -0.699
Individual Fair. Class Balance -0.007 -0.014
Group Fair. Feature Balance -0.632 -0.523
Predictive Fair. Feature Balance -0.408 -0.401
Individual Fair. Feature Balance -0.418 -0.274
Table 4. Pearson’s and Spearman’s correlation coefficient between
different properties. In all the cases the coefficients are statistically
significant (p-value < 0.001).
Table 5 illustrates the results of our evaluations over
different choices of the regularizer: no regularizer in-
volved (None), L1 and L2 regularizers (L1 & L2), the
group fairness (δg), the predictive fairness (δp), the indi-
vidual fairness (δi), and the mutual information (IX). In
Algorithm 1: Training a model using our pro-
posed regularizer.
Data: D(X, y): target training dataset; k, l,m:
constants.
1 g0, g1 ← g0 ∪ g1 = D, g0 ∩ g1 = φ
2 for k number of epochs do
3 for l times do
4 D′ ← sampling m records (xi, yi) from D
5 ft, θ ← target model trained on D′
6 yˆ ← prediction results on g0, g1
7 r ← choose one from
{δg(ft, yˆ), δp(ft, yˆ), δi(ft, yˆ), I(X; θ)}
8 r ← maxl r
9 ft ← descend gradients over θ by
5θ 1
m
m∑
i=1
l(ft(xi), yi) + λ
∑
j
|θ × er|
addition, we also record the maximum decrement of our
proposed regularizers during the training process (the
column Max Diff. in Table 5).
Particularly, for all the studied regularizers that use
fairness values, the obtained results show success both
in terms of improving the model’s performance and re-
ducing MIA accuracy compared to the models using ei-
ther no regularizer or L1 and L2 regularizers. However,
the mutual information does not provide the promising
improvement as we expect. Comparing the total decre-
ment of the regularizers over the training process (Max
Diff. in Table 5) with our results in Figure 9 and Fig-
ure 11, the success of our proposed regularizers depends
on whether their overall decrement throughout the train-
ing process can significantly decrease the MIA accuracy.
In the case of mutual information the total decrement is
in the range [0, 0.01], and such a small variation cannot
significantly improve MIA resilience as depicted in the
results in Figure 9. It should also be noted that the ef-
fectiveness of regularizers is bound to their initial values,
i.e. the ones in the initial steps of the training. In partic-
ular, large initial values imply that the model may not
gain sufficient improvement in resilience to MIA over the
training process, especially when regularizer decrements
are small or the training converges very quickly.
In addition, we also perform the experiments on dif-
ferent regularizer functions. For example, in case of the
Texas dataset, while using δp as a regularizer, modifying
the amount of regularizing to
∑
j |(θ)2 × r| reduces the
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(a) Purchase dataset.
Regularizers Train Acc. Test Acc. MIA Acc. Max Diff.
None 73.04 72.80 73.89 –
L1 76.78 76.81 55.29 –
L2 76.69 76.94 59.13 –
δg 85.00 84.72 50.03 0.66
δp 84.72 84.59 48.84 0.50
δi 84.89 84.93 51.99 0.28
IX 73.14 73.35 51.15 0.02
(b) Texas dataset.
Regularizers Train Acc. Test Acc. MIA Acc. Max Diff.
None 76.17 75.87 74.04 –
L1 79.93 80.34 55.76 –
L2 78.63 78.74 55.72 –
δg 84.75 84.71 53.27 1
δp 84.73 84.80 58.53 0.35
δi 84.71 84.72 58.15 0.33
IX 70.93 70.77 59.40 0.01
(c) Adult dataset.
Regularizers Train Acc. Test Acc. MIA Acc. Max Diff.
None 76.54 76.52 73.36 –
L1 76.42 76.72 52.41 –
L2 69.64 69.83 53.95 –
δg 84.49 84.52 52.33 0.8
δp 84.57 84.15 51.84 0.51
δi 84.41 84.60 50.25 0.48
IX 70.14 70.31 53.34 0.01
Table 5. Train, test and MIA accuracy (%) for different regularizers
(Max Diff.: the maximum reduction of the regularizer values during
the training process. When the training is terminated, those
regularizers would end up with their optimal status, which is 0).
MIA accuracy to 54% and the train and test accuracy
to 83.9% and 84.8% respectively.
6 Conclusion & Future Work
We provided a comprehensive analysis analyzes the ef-
fect of several data and model properties on MIA (using
the shadow model approach [30]) accuracy.
Our investigation shows that a vulnerable training
dataset typically has at least one of the following prop-
erties: relatively small (compared to the adversary’s
shadow dataset), imbalanced classes or features, low en-
tropy. On the other hand, choosing the right model with
proper hyperparameter settings (deeper and larger neu-
ral networks) can reduce the vulnerability to MIA. An
ML model that learns too much about the training data
and produces higher mutual information between the
records and the model’s parameters is also more likely
to exhibit a high MIA accuracy. Additionally, we found
that fairer ML models are more resilient against MIA.
We further study how our findings on data and
model properties versus MIA accuracy can be utilised
to strengthen ML privacy. We apply model properties
that positively impact the MIA accuracy, such as group,
predictive and individual fairness and mutual informa-
tion between the records and the parameters as regular-
izers in the ML model. We observed that all the three
fairness regularizers reduce the MIA accuracy as well as
the model’s training loss.
Limitations and Future works. In this paper, we
only considered MIA (in its shadow model approach [30])
as a privacy threat to ML models, while other variants
of black-box attacks such as the relaxed MIA [27], model
inversion attacks [34] and attribute inference attacks [15]
are yet to be studied. In addition, it is necessary to
study the information leakage risks in other variants of
ML algorithms, such as re-enforced ML and agent-based
modelling. Besides, as the defenses are model-specific,
further research needs to be conducted towards formu-
lating a comprehensive defense mechanism against MIA
that is not bounded by the type of the target model.
While assessing all factors contributing to MIA suc-
cess certainly remains an open research problems, our
results show that many several properties beyond over-
fitting could be leveraged to further protect ML Mod-
els against membership inference attacks without giving
away the model’s prediction accuracy.
For future work we plan to :
– Further explore other data and model properties
and their impact on different black-box and white-
box ML adversarial attacks;
– Further investigate those properties, such as the
number of features, that show weak correlation with
MIA or inconsistent results across datasets, and
identify other impactful data and model properties;
– Develop model-independent defense mechanisms
against the attacks, suitable to a wide range of ML
algorithms, e.g. applicable to the decision trees or
the random forests.
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